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6C. A. Bowers has taught at the University of Oregon and Portland State 
University, and now, in retirement, serves as adjunct professor of environmental 
studies at the University of Oregon. He is the author of many books that examine
how public schools and universities perpetuate the cultural values and deep 
patterns of thinking that co-evolved with the Industrial Revolution. His most 
recent books are Educating for an Ecologically Sustainable Culture (1995); The 
Culture of Denial (1997); Let Them Eat Data (2000); and Educating for Eco-
Justice and Community (2001). chard Rorty’s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (l989) serves as an 
portant example of the double bind the ecological crisis now places 
 in. That a highly esteemed philosopher who has taken on the task of 
gning our epistemological assumptions with a vision of liberalism 
at seems half John Stuart Mill and half John Dewey completely 
nores the ecological crisis suggests the real depth of the difficulties 
at lie ahead; at least for those of us who expect philosophers to make 
ontribution to addressing the paramount issues of the day. Rorty’s 
ence is not so much the problem as is his influence on that part of the 
scourse where philosophy and ideology merge in a more self-
nscious manner. This brings us to the real source of the double bind; 
mely, the form of liberalism Rorty proposes we adopt in the name of 
ogress is reactionary in terms of bringing our cultural patterns into 
stainable balance with the life sustaining eco-systems. Before 
nsidering why Rorty’s arguments lead to one of the most reactionary 
d nihilistic formulations of modern liberalism it is essential to 
mmarize what has now become part of the daily news coverage on 
e damage being done to different systems that constitute the biosphere 
on which human life depends.  
cording to numerous scientific reports, the demands of a rapidly 
panding human population (which increased nearly 3 billion over the 
t 50 years ) on natural systems are contributing to a greenhouse 
fect that threatens major disruptions in other areas of the biosphere, 
cluding the fertility of soils already depleted by our overuse of 
trochemicals and availability of usable fresh water. The increasing 
vastation of tropical forests (about 27 million acres a year) and loss 
The Trumpeter 
 
 
of species diversity among plants and animals continues unabated. To 
this alarming list must be added the vast amounts of toxic wastes being 
poured into the atmosphere, onto the land, and into the water systems. 
That human cultures may be close to crossing critical thresholds in the 
capacity of natural systems to sustain life is a possibility that is being 
given serious consideration by both national and international agencies 
that are monitoring a growing body of scientific evidence.  
Aside from the numbers of people in Africa and Asia who are starving 
(or perilously close) in numbers that overwhelm our capacity to 
comprehend fully what is happening and how to respond, we must also 
recognize that the wealthy countries of the world (which constitute only 
a fourth of the population) consume 80 per cent of the world’s 
commercial energy, and that 40 per cent of all the carbon dioxide 
building up in the atmosphere is emitted by the seven most wealthy 
countries of North America and Europe. The figures and trends cited 
here should now be familiar to anybody who has even the most casual 
contact with the media. But what the litany of daily news reports on the 
worsening condition of the environment fail to address is the way in 
which cultural beliefs and practices contribute to the deepening crisis.  
It is against this background of rapid environmental degradation that 
Rorty’s ideas must be judged. Rorty’s arguments on the nature of 
language and thought, as well as his attempt to extrapolate a coherent 
set of ideological guidelines for living a personally and socially 
meaningful life, are framed in a vocabulary that has wide appeal to 
people who still believe in the emancipatory and progressive vision of 
liberalism. Unfortunately, readers who identify with his messianic 
political vocabulary may lose sight of the fact that the ecological crisis 
is the most important challenge we face. In assessing the adequacy of 
Rorty’s ideas for meeting this challenge, we must also keep in mind that 
the stream of liberalism he proposes to revitalize served as the 
ideological engine of the Industrial Revolution that treated the earth as 
an exploitable resource. As one of the central arguments being 
advanced here is that this stream of liberalism (as well as its more 
technocratic mutations) is exacerbating the cultural forces that continue 
to degrade the earth’s eco-systems, it is important to avoid treating the 
vocabulary of liberalism as sacrosanct. We must also be open to 
considering the possibility that primal cultures that have evolved 
ecologically sustainable ways of knowing may have more relevance for 
addressing the current imbalance between cultural demands and life-
sustaining capabilities of eco-systems than the ideas of leading 
philosophers like Richard Rorty.  
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Rorty’s vision of a liberal society that optimizes the individual’s need 
for self-creation, and at the same time reduces suffering, is based on a 
radical view of language, which he attributes to Donald Davidson. 
Although Rorty does not acknowledge it, this view of language also has 
roots in several other academic disciplines—including the sociology of 
knowledge—which treats all beliefs and values as contingent (that is, as 
relative). The following statements by Rorty sum up the two main 
threads of his arguments about the language-thought connection, and 
the form of liberal society his contingency view of language leads us to. 
Following the lead of Nietzsche, Freud, and now Derrida, Rorty 
suggests that we should “treat everything—our language, our 
conscience, our community—as a product of time and chance.”1 He 
also reiterates the competitive model of classical liberalism when he 
writes: “a liberal society is one which is content to call ‘true’ (or ‘right’ 
or ‘just’) whatever the outcome of undistorted communication happens 
to be, whatever view wins in a free and open encounter.”2 Rorty’s view 
of what will hold together the ideal liberal society, what he terms the 
“glue,” is also quite interesting—given the expressions that anomic 
individualism have taken in the last few decades. The necessary “glue” 
is a shared “consensus that the point of social organization is to let 
everybody have a chance at self-creation to the best of his or her 
abilities, and that that goal requires, beside peace and wealth, the 
standard ‘bourgeois freedoms.’”3 But perhaps the most critically 
important statement by Rorty, given the relativism of these previous 
quotations, is that the charge of relativism “should not be answered, but 
rather evaded.”4 That is, the argument that his position is built upon the 
shifting sands of relativism (nihilism would be a more accurate term) 
must be viewed as an expression of a “deep metaphysical need.” The 
antidote he prescribes for this archaic intellectual and moral condition is 
to invent new vocabularies that will reframe how the problem is 
understood.  
As his liberal ideology is based on what he sees as the successful 
overturning of the epistemological-metaphysical problems that have 
bedevilled philosophers from Plato to the present, we shall focus on the 
adequacy of how he represents the language-thought connection. This is 
the connection, from his point of view, that has been incorrectly 
understood, thus leading to a long and varied history of false claims 
about the correspondence between thought and the external world. In 
claiming that the world is indifferent to how humans describe and think 
about it, Rorty is taking a position that would be supported by thinkers 
who identify with different streams within the sociology of knowledge 
(from Marx to Peter Berger), and even by cultural anthropologists like 
Clifford Geertz. But they avoid the problem of relativism by 
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recognizing the intersubjective nature of human understanding, and that 
most of the shared cultural knowledge is experienced as part of the 
person’s natural attitude toward everyday life. Rorty omits these 
considerations by adopting Donald Davidson’s instrumentalist view of 
metaphor as the primary basis for understanding the language-thought 
connection. This strategy enables him to build an argument for thinking 
of the individual in the atomistic and voluntaristic terms required by his 
desire to give new life to a now largely defunct interpretation of 
liberalism. But his position is made especially vulnerable by the fact 
that Davidson, with the characteristic penchant of British philosophers 
for treating language as a culture-free phenomenon, adopts one of the 
most narrow interpretations of metaphorical thinking in the literature. 
Rorty’s more general views of language would be accepted today by 
many scholars as conventional wisdom: that humans create language, 
that language helps to constitute how the world is understood and 
experienced, and that language is used to express the inherently 
metaphorical nature of human thought. Or as Rorty puts it, the history 
of thought “is the history of metaphor.” But few would accept his way 
of understanding of the role that metaphor plays. Citing Nietzsche’s 
definition of “truth” as a “mobile army of metaphors,” Rorty sees 
himself establishing the basis of another Nietzschean-like 
pronouncement: namely, that philosophy is dead. Epistemological and 
metaphysical concerns, in effect, cannot be taken seriously when we 
recognize that thought is metaphorical, and that metaphorical 
constructions are a result of historical contingencies (that is, chance 
occurrences that reflect the absence of an inherent purpose and order in 
the world). As there is no basis for a final vocabulary, Rorty turns away 
from philosophy and toward ideology. Had he adopted a more 
culturally grounded view of metaphorical thinking he might have 
avoided a problem that has contributed to the sterility of Western 
philosophy. That is, the failure to recognize that such words as truth, 
rationality, justice, language, individualism, equality, and all the other 
godwords of professional philosophers, cannot be properly understood 
apart from the cultural groups who use them. This is, in part, the 
message of Alasdair MacIntyre’s Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
Rorty refers to culture, but in treating the word as another expression of 
his abstract theory of contingency he fails to recognize that the patterns 
of a culture, whether we are talking about linguistic, social interaction, 
or forms of aesthetic expression, are experienced by its members as part 
of their natural attitude—like the taken-for-granted patterns of the 
cultural group Rorty reproduces in both his form of communication and 
patterns of thinking (e.g., his unquestioning acceptance of the myth of 
progress).  
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In his more general statements about the history of thought being based 
on metaphorical thinking, Rorty inadvertently gives support for a view 
of metaphor he wants to deny in his more direct explanations of how we 
use metaphors. But as his more focused explanation serves as the 
fulcrum upon which he balances both his image of the “ironist” who is 
the new hero figure he presents us with and his views on the nature of 
liberal society, we shall turn to this more pivotal part of his argument.  
According to Rorty, we will face up to the contingent nature of human 
existence when we develop “a willingness to face up to the contingency 
of the language we use.”5 And we can understand the contingent nature 
of language by taking seriously Donald Davidson’s way of thinking 
about language and, more specifically, his view of metaphor. The 
strength of Davidson’s position, as Rorty puts it, is that “he does not 
view language as a medium for either expression or representation.” 
This leads to the claim, which Rorty accepts, that metaphors do not 
have “a special meaning, a specific cognitive content.”6 But if 
metaphors do not possess cognitive content (that is, do not provide a 
schema for understanding) then what function do they perform? 
Davidson’s answer is: “What distinguishes metaphor is not meaning, 
but use—in this it is like assertion, hinting, lying, promising, or 
criticizing.”7 That is, metaphors (which Rorty equates with language) 
are like tools, and thus must be assessed in purely instrumental terms. 
According to Rorty,  
We should restrict ourselves to questions like “Does our use of these words get in 
the way of our use of other words?” This is a question about whether our use of 
tools is inefficient, not a question about whether our beliefs are contradictory.8  
This view of language, as a vocabulary that elicits responses in the 
same way as grunts, groans, and pauses, provides the basis for Rorty’s 
view of the ironists who have “radical and continuing doubts” about the 
vocabulary they use, who realize that their “present vocabulary can 
neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts,” and who do not consider 
that their current “vocabulary is closer to reality than others.”9 This 
instrumentalist view of metaphor serves to provide the conceptual 
foundation for Rorty’s arguments that language should be understood as 
part of the process of natural evolution, “as new forms of life 
[metaphors] constantly kill off old forms—not to accomplish a higher 
purpose, but blindly.”10 But it differs radically from the views of 
metaphor advanced by Mark Johnson, George Lakoff, Donald Schon, 
and Michael Reddy—to cite just a few of the scholars who make a 
convincing case that metaphor provides a schema of understanding and 
thus have cognitive content within a language community. I should like 
to summarize this more mainstream view of the connection between 
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metaphor and thought by situating the discussion within a cultural 
context. This is essential both for understanding a major area of silence 
in Rorty’s theory, as well as for bringing into focus how Rorty’s view 
of a liberal society would further exacerbate the ecological crisis.  
What the Rorty/Davidson view of metaphor cannot account for is how 
the root metaphors of a cultural group (which can also be understood as 
master narratives, world views, paradigms, and so forth) influence the 
process of analogic thinking, and the subsequent encoding of the 
schema of understanding worked out in the process of analogic thinking 
in the iconic metaphors that do their work at the taken-for-granted level 
of understanding characteristic of everyday discourse. If we consider 
the symbolic world of cultural groups not overwhelmed by the 
syncretism of modernity, we find a shared way of thinking, 
communicating, developing and using technologies, and expressing 
aesthetic preferences that are made coherent by their root metaphors. 
An example is the Kwakuitl of the Pacific Northwest whose culture was 
organized in terms of a master schema of understanding (root 
metaphor) that represented all life as part of a process of eating and 
being eaten by others. Stanley Walens describes their root metaphor in 
the following manner:  
Thus, the Kwakiutl moral universe becomes united, not by any vague religious 
sense but by the fact that the entire universe contains all beings within its bounds, 
and that all beings are subject to the principle of being both hungry and the food of 
other beings who are themselves hungry. The Kwakiutl universe is a universe of 
related beings, all of whom have the moral responsibility to control their eating. 
Eating is a universal property of the world, and thus it is the basis of morality.11  
Masks, dwellings, implements, dances, and narratives are given a form 
that expresses metaphorically this way of understanding the universe. 
The root metaphor also serves to frame their way of understanding what 
constitutes a moral life—which is synonymous with being Kwakiutl. 
Because the world is viewed as discordant and self-destructive, as life is 
sustained only by making a meal of other life, it is “only when its 
inhabitants agree to co-operate to maintain order at the expense of their 
own personal desires, agree to suppress their hunger, and to modify it 
into its proper proportion can the world operate.”12 This basic 
organizing schema influences how relationships are understood as well 
as bodily actions and forms of knowing—as witnessed in how the rights 
to various forms of food are organized, how the life of an animal may 
be taken, and how the preparation of food is divided along gender lines. 
Each cultural pattern has metaphorical significance.  
We can see in our own history how a root metaphor provides a master 
schema for the process of analogic thinking. When Johannes Kepler 
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wrote in l605 that “my aim is to show that the celestial machine is to be 
likened not to a divine organism but to a clockwork,”13 he was helping 
to establish the foundations of a new root metaphor that would, like the 
Kwakiutl cosmology, provide the master schema for organizing the 
culture—including the early development of science, the technological 
revolution, and our way of thinking about nature. For example, William 
Harvey broke with the final vocabulary used by Medieval thinkers, to 
use Rorty’s phrase, when he referred to the human heart as a “pump.” 
Though separated by nearly 400 years, the Cal Tech professor who said, 
“In a sense the hardware for making a man is 23 chromosomes” was 
engaging in a process of analogic thinking framed by the same (slightly 
updated) root metaphor. It would be highly unlikely that the Cal Tech 
professor working on the frontier of molecular biology would be aware 
of how a deeply rooted cultural template had influenced him to 
represent a human being in mechanistic terms. Root metaphors partially 
expressed in such images as fallen man (or original sin), a man-centred 
universe, a mechanistic universe (and now as a giant computer), and 
Gaia, as well as iconic metaphors that encode earlier processes of 
analogic thinking (e.g., artificial intelligence, individualism, freedom, 
data, and so forth) provide schemas that connect individual 
thought/experience to the deeper symbolic levels of a cultural group. 
And this “determinative memory,” to use Gregory Bateson’s phrase,14 
operates largely at the level of the individual’s natural attitude; that is, 
the individual is largely unaware of how the cultural episteme 
influences the process of thinking. 
Mark Johnson sums up in the following way the complexity of 
conceptual patterns, continuities, and layered nature of metaphorical 
thinking:  
. . . understanding does not consist merely of after-the-fact reflections on prior 
experiences; it is, more fundamentally, the way (or means by which) we have 
those experiences in the first place. It is the way our world presents itself to us. 
And this is a result of the massive complex of our culture, language, history, and 
bodily mechanisms that blend to make our world what it is. Image schemata and 
their metaphorical projections are primary patterns of this ‘blending.’ Our 
subsequent propositional reflections on our experience are made possible by this 
more basic mode of understanding.15  
It should be added that our “propositional reflections” are also framed 
by these taken-for-granted schemas of understanding. The 
Rorty/Davidson view of metaphor lacks this depth of cultural 
contextualization, and thus represents a serious misunderstanding of the 
metaphor/thought connection.  
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Rorty’s view of ironists as strong poets (that is, individuals who 
endlessly metaphorize without needing assurances that language has 
any cognitive relationship to the larger ecology of which they are a 
part) leads him to embrace a view of liberalism that contains an inner 
tension between the rights of the individual and the responsibilities of 
community membership. Although Rorty has an aversion for all final 
vocabularies, he nevertheless acknowledges that  
Western social and political thought may have had the last conceptual revolution it 
needs. J. S. Mill’s suggestion that governments devote themselves to optimizing 
the balance between leaving people’s private lives alone and preventing suffering 
seems to me pretty much the last word.”16  
As a number of recent theorists have addressed the problem of how to 
reconcile the areas of conflict that arise from this formulation, most 
notably William Sullivan, Benjamin Barber, and Robert Bellah, I shall 
frame my criticisms of Rorty’s liberalism in terms of the ecological 
crisis—which now seems to be the paramount political as well as 
existential issue. 
Rorty’s view of the ideal political system that will maximize the 
freedoms of ironist individuals (i.e., autonomous individuals) is based 
on a number of cultural assumptions that can be traced back to early 
Hebrew and Christian theology, and to the Enlightenment tradition of 
thinking that now underlies modern society: the linear organization of 
time that trivializes the cycles of the natural world, the progressive 
nature of change, the efficacy of abstract ideas, the individual as an 
autonomous rational and moral agent, and the anthropocentric universe. 
The identification of these cultural assumptions is critical to 
understanding why Rorty’s liberalism represents the ultimate irony; that 
is, how the anthropocentric cultural assumptions underlying what many 
Western thinkers regard as the most progressive and enlightened way of 
thinking have been turned into a reactionary position by the ecological 
crisis.  
For all his protestations about metaphysical thinkers who want to 
discover truth and then impose their final vocabulary upon others, 
Rorty’s own thinking is deeply rooted in the Western myth of progress. 
For example, in the struggle between metaphysicians and ironists he 
sees the latter prevailing. This same sense of progress is expressed in 
his argument that we should “see language as we now see evolution, as 
new forms of life constantly kill off old forms . . .”17 While he rejects 
the idea of cosmic design or a purpose being worked out in the 
evolutionary process, he nevertheless retains the assumption that a life 
based on continual doubt, and the acceptance of contingency, represents 
a progressive process—just as his reference to Mill’s formulation of a 
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liberal society is framed by a view of political evolution that is 
progressive in nature.  
Rorty’s embeddedness in the Western view of progress can also be seen 
in his way of understanding tradition. Part of the legacy of the 
Enlightenment was to frame tradition in binary terms. Tradition 
represented the dead weight of the past on the living present; it was also 
regarded as circumscribing the individual’s potential for rational self-
direction. Progress was (and still is) understood as moving away from 
tradition. This binary way of thinking precludes the possibility of 
considering tradition and progress as complementary; just as it is 
impossible within this binary framework to view social change as the 
renewal of tradition. Rorty’s Enlightenment attitude toward tradition 
can also be seen in the intellectual and emotional traits he associates 
with ironist thinkers whose task of self-creation is dependent on 
continually questioning the authority of tradition. According to Rorty, 
“ironists are afraid that they will get stuck in the vocabulary in which 
they were brought up if they only know the people in their own 
neighborhood . . .”18 For the ironist individual, tradition poses a 
particularly difficult existential challenge because there are no criteria 
for judging whether the basis of their continual questioning is justified. 
Writes Rorty:  
The ironist spends her time worrying about the possibility that she has been 
initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game. She worries 
that the process of socialization which turned her into a human being by giving her 
a language may have given her the wrong language, and so turned her into the 
wrong kind of human being. But she cannot give a criterion for wrongness.19  
In another passage, Rorty states that “the opposite of irony is common 
sense. For [common sense] is the watchword of those who 
unconsciously describe everything in terms of the final vocabulary to 
which they and those around them are habituated.”20 The common 
sense (what others might call the taken-for-granted patterns) and the 
habituated are, in Rorty’s way of thinking, synonymous with tradition, 
and are thus a source of authority external to the individual. In good 
Enlightenment fashion, Rorty wants to locate authority in the reflective 
doubts of the individual, even if that “reminds herself of her 
rootlessness.”21
Irony is also an appropriate word for understanding Rorty’s view of 
tradition, as the authority for his actions and thoughts is embedded in 
traditions that are part of his own natural attitude—or what he terms 
“common sense.” These include, in terms of what is visible to the 
reader, the patterns of writing from left to right; organizing and 
expressing thoughts in terms of a subject-verb-object pattern shared by 
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the rest of his language community; using the conventions of capital 
letters, spaces between words, and paragraphs; and holding the belief 
that explicit and propositional representations of knowledge have more 
authority and legitimacy than tacit or orally communicated forms of 
knowledge. The reader would probably be correct in surmising that 
Rorty also takes for granted such other forms of tradition as money (and 
royalty payments), technologies, libraries, clothes, and non-verbal 
patterns of communication—to cite just a few of the areas of daily life 
that involve the re-enactment and, over time, transformation of 
traditional patterns. The problem with Rorty, as philosopher and liberal 
ideologue, is that he is embedded in what Edward Shils refers to as an 
“anti-tradition tradition”; that is, a tradition of thinking that has as its 
mission the denigration of all forms of knowledge considered as 
limiting the possibility of human emancipation. The problem is that this 
tradition, which has split into intense rivalries, has given legitimacy to a 
limited number of ways of knowing—and most of these are highly 
experimental in that they make a virtue of newness and originality. 
Knowledge learned through bodily experience, tacit forms of 
understanding and performance, spiritual knowledge, and knowledge 
encoded in technologies and cultural patterns, simply have been ignored 
by philosophers, like Rorty, who are in the anti-tradition tradition of 
Enlightenment thinking.  
Rorty’s view of the ironist individual reflects another assumption that 
has been a mainstay of many liberal thinkers: namely, that the 
intentions and acts of critically reflective individuals (ironists) will be 
essentially good. Whereas James Madison argued for institutionalizing 
checks and balances in order to protect society from selfishly motivated 
misuses of power, Rorty represents the ironist individual as possessing 
a natural proclivity of acting toward others in a way that enhances 
solidarity and the alleviation of pain and suffering. This natural 
proclivity, however, should not be “thought of as a recognition of a core 
self, the human essence, in all human beings.” Nevertheless, he states 
that “the view I am offering says that there is such a thing as moral 
progress, and that this progress is indeed in the direction of greater 
human solidarity.”22 Perhaps the best example of Rorty’s optimism can 
be seen in how he frames the problem of reconciling responsibility 
toward others and the ironist’s pursuit of self-interest—which he refers 
to as “self-creation.” Writes Rorty: “. . .our responsibilities to others 
constitute only the public side of our lives, a side which competes with 
our private affections and our private attempts at self-creation, and 
which has no automatic priority over such private motives.” What a 
moral obligation means is also to be worked out by ironists who do not 
consider that their “vocabulary is closer to reality than others . . .”23 In 
Volume 19, Number 2 15
the final analysis, the moral relativism of Rorty’s position is defensible 
only because of his optimism about the proclivity of ironist 
individuals—an optimism that is not historically grounded. 
The above quotations provide a good picture of Rorty’s view of 
community as an ongoing set of relationships where each member 
attempts to reconcile self-creation with their equally individualistic 
interpretation of the meaning of solidarity. But there is another aspect 
of his view of community that has particular relevance in terms of the 
ecological crisis. Rorty’s way of understanding community, like both 
the Classical Liberal and Deweyian traditions he resonates with, 
involves humans only. In effect, Rorty’s efforts to envision human life 
lived without the false security of final vocabularies remains embedded 
in the root metaphor of an anthropocentric universe. It is his 
unconscious acceptance of this root metaphor that frames his 
understanding of community in a way that ignores the interdependence 
of humans with other life forms that make up the biosphere. When we 
recognize this interdependence, which involves the viability of food 
chains that are far more basic to life than final or any other form of 
vocabulary, both Rorty’s liberalism and his naive epistemological 
formulations begin to unravel. There are indeed absolutes that govern 
relationships, and one of the most critical ones is that humans 
(including “strong poets”) cannot survive the destruction of their 
habitat. The well being of humans and habitat, over the long run, go 
together—though the habitat would not be adversely affected if humans 
were to disappear.  
There have been a number of thinkers who have used the natural 
ecology as a root metaphor for challenging key elements of liberal 
thought. Aldo Leopold, for example, argues that humans must be 
understood in terms of their place in the food chain. Whereas Rorty’s 
anthropocentrism leads him to limit moral obligations to the domain of 
human relationships, Leopold extends the boundaries of moral 
obligation to include all the other elements contributing to what he 
describes as “energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and 
animals.”24 He even argues for a moral absolute: “A thing is right when 
it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”25 That is, freedom is 
to be understood as self-limitation for the sake of others. But this is not 
meant to be understood in altruistic terms; “others” include the entire 
biotic community that is the source of energy for sustaining life. 
Viewed in ecological terms, self-limitation is essential over the long 
term to the sustenance of the individual’s own life—including her/his 
progeny.  
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Gregory Bateson is another thinker who has challenged the 
anthropocentric foundations upon which Rorty’s intellectual edifice 
rests. Unlike Rorty, who views thought as a mental activity occurring in 
the head of each individual, Bateson argues that mental activity 
(“information,” in its most simple form of expression) is synonymous 
with an ecological system. As he puts it, “the mental characteristics of 
the system are immanent, not in some part, but in the system as a 
whole.”26 A system, for Bateson, should be understood in cybernetic 
terms, where a “difference that makes a difference” represents the most 
primitive and basic unit of information. Bateson also recognizes that the 
information exchanges that occur in the relationships that characterize a 
natural “ecology” (where humans are not necessarily the principal 
actors) are understood by humans on a metaphorical and thus 
conceptual level.  
The metaphorical constructions are, in Bateson’s terminology, the 
conceptual maps or schemas that make interpretation possible; the 
ecology of differences that make a difference represent the territory. 
Conceptual maps are not always adequate for recognizing the 
characteristics of the territory. Or in more Batesonian terms, many of 
the information exchanges occurring in the system are not thought 
about or adequately understood because of the individual’s conceptual 
(cultural) way of knowing. One expression of this possible incongruity 
between map and territory is the metaphorical representation of the 
individual as an autonomous thinker—which is the position Rorty 
adopts. Another example of the inappropriateness of a conceptual map 
to an understanding of the information exchanges that are part of a 
cybernetic system was the long-term failure to recognize the 
relationship between pesticide use and the decline of animal 
populations. Before Rachel Carson challenged the conceptual maps that 
characterized l950s’ thinking, pesticides were thought of in terms of 
controlling “pests”—which is itself an interesting metaphor that 
illuminates and hides in accordance with a cultural group’s root 
metaphors. A third example is the long held belief in a form of progress 
that involves the depletion of non-renewable resources. The purpose of 
Bateson’s metaphorical distinction between map and territory is to 
highlight how our lives are inextricably embedded in natural systems, 
and that all human activities involve relationships with other elements 
that make up an ecosystem. Two statements by Bateson sum up the 
basic difference that separates him from the anthropocentrism of Rorty:  
The total self-corrective unit which processes information, or as I say, “thinks” 
and “acts” and “decides,” is a system whose boundaries do not at all coincide with 
the boundaries either of the body or of what is popularly called the “self” or 
“consciousness”. . .27  
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And in addressing the question of whether individuals can survive 
while the natural systems that make up their habitat fail, he states that 
“the unit of evolutionary survival turns out to be identical with the unit 
of mind.”28 It must be remembered here that, for Bateson, the unit of 
mind is the ecological system of which the individual is an interactive 
member.  
Western philosophy has been a part of a nearly 2500-year effort to 
establish a new regime of truth that led to viewing primal peoples as 
intellectually and culturally inferior. These mostly agrarian, non-literate 
cultures have been studied scientifically and used as a source of 
artifacts for museum curators. They have also been used as a reference 
point for determining how far the rationally based cultures of the West 
have evolved. One of the possibilities denied by this regime of truth is 
that there is anything really important to learn from these cultures. But 
with the growing awareness that the values and ways of thinking 
underlying Western technological practices are degrading the habitat at 
an alarming rate, there is a growing recognition that primal cultures 
may be important for reasons that go beyond our fascination with their 
form of aesthetic expression. Of particular interest now is their ability 
to live in sustainable balance with their habitat. That they have been 
able to do this over a span of time we are not likely to match, even with 
our “superior” forms of culture, makes their achievement even more 
remarkable.  
Although primal cultures vary widely in their belief systems, 
technologies, and patterns for guiding daily life, there are a number of 
shared traits that relate directly to their ability to live within the margins 
of their habitats. A brief identification of these characteristics may help 
put in focus why Rorty’s more progressive and rationally based ideas 
would likely contribute to further accelerating the destruction of the 
environment. The identification of these characteristics is not meant to 
be taken as ready made patterns we can adopt for our own culture. But 
they can suggest new pathways we might evolve along in our own 
distinctive way.  
In the concluding chapter of Pig Earth, John Berger identifies a basic 
difference that separates modern cultures from tradition-oriented primal 
cultures. He notes that peoples who live within the limits of their 
bioregion tend not to be experimental in terms of new ideas, values, and 
technologies; nor do they view the future as an ever expanding horizon 
of new possibilities. As a people who have survived where others have 
perished, their chief concern is to hand on to the next generation the 
means of survival, which means ideas, values and technologies that 
have been proven within the context of their own lives. The exemplary 
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models or analogues for how to live are thus located in the past, but the 
obligations are to ensure that the possibilities for survival of future 
generations have not been diminished by current practices.29 Berger 
points out that the Western approaches to modernization are based on 
the opposite way of thinking. We view the future in terms of expanding 
knowledge, power, and consumer conveniences; that we might already 
be close to the margins of survival in terms of availability of topsoil, 
uncontaminated water and air, and other non-renewable resources, is 
not a concern of most modern thinkers. For example, Rorty makes 
experimentation with ideas and values the highest achievement of the 
ironist individual; in fact, moral and intellectual relativism are 
represented by him as synonymous with progress.  
Another contrasting characteristic of primal cultures is the manner in 
which their root metaphors (epic narratives, mythic accounts of origins, 
and so forth) situate humans within the natural world, rather than 
separate from it or in a hierarchical relationship where humans are 
given a privileged position that allows the rest of the biotic community 
to be treated as a “natural resource.” The root metaphors are 
constitutive of the cultural group’s way of knowing, sense of moral 
obligation, and use of technology—just as our root metaphors have 
been the foundations upon which our cultural beliefs and technological 
practices rest. One of the implications of primal root metaphors that 
represent humans as interdependent with other life forms, while 
avoiding the separate conceptual categories that keep certain forms of 
knowledge and technological practices isolated from moral 
considerations, is that their technological practices are guided by their 
understanding of moral and spiritual relationships. In effect, the 
technological, moral, and spiritual are not separate domains of 
experience; it should also be pointed out that their knowledge of local 
habitats often represented a depth of knowledge and technical skill that 
exceeds what is now possessed by all but the most specialized modern 
person (and the modern expert generally has a very narrow range of 
competency).  
The last characteristic that will be used as a basis for questioning the 
relevance of Rorty’s thinking for living in sustainable balance with the 
ecosystem has to do with how primal cultures have chosen the 
pathways of developing the spiritual languages of dance, song, 
narrative, and art rather than the more political pathways that 
characterize Western cultures. These spiritual languages, as Gary 
Snyder points out, represent forms of cultural storage of a collected and 
tested wisdom of how to live in a balanced relationship with the rest of 
the biotic community. That is, the spiritual languages provided the 
moral/political/spiritual templates for regulating group life. In effect, 
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primal cultures appear to have evolved in a way that expanded the 
symbolic world for its members, while reducing the political domain. 
They also provide members of the culture a means of active 
participation in the celebration, sanctification, and renewal of these 
highly metaphorized templates. Lastly, it should be pointed out that 
participation in these spiritual languages does not require the 
degradation of the physical environment, which has not been the case in 
our efforts to provide for the forms of happiness and success demanded 
by the self-creative form of individualism that seems to be at the centre 
of popular culture.  
The difference that separates the form of liberal culture needed to 
maximize the freedom of Rorty’s ironist individual from primal cultures 
that used their marginal bioregions to construct complex symbolic 
worlds, brings into question another assumption Rorty takes for 
granted. The characteristics of thought that Rorty associates with the 
ironist individual contributes to politicizing more areas of cultural 
life—which appears to be the exact opposite to ecologically sustainable 
cultures. That is, questioning the final vocabularies and common sense 
that provide the sense of authority (taken for grantedness) for the 
patterns that guide daily practices has the effect of relativizing them. 
Questioning the cosmology and ceremonies that maintain the temple 
system for regulating the irrigation water essential to the ecosystems of 
Bali, to cite a concrete example, might create more ironist individuals 
(Rorty’s goal) but it would threaten the food production patterns that 
depend on the complex integration of social and natural cycles worked 
out over the past several centuries by the Balinese. Furthermore, if 
every individual emulated Rorty’s ironist as a cultural model, the 
relativizing process would be extended by the need of individuals to 
rely upon their own interpretations and need for self-creation. The 
political process of reconstituting the patterns upon which relationships 
are to be based and resources allocated would thus become even more 
fractious. But Rorty does not acknowledge this problem. The difficulty 
of achieving new grounds of consensus opens the door to a form of 
politics based on the illusion that technicist solutions are politically 
neutral. Either way, the epistemological foundations of Rorty’s 
liberalism would contribute to furthering an experimental approach to 
the political process, rather than using the political process within a 
moral framework committed to sustaining and improving ecologically 
viable cultural patterns.  
The basic issue posed by the ability of primal cultures, with their non-
experimental and non-individualistic approach to politics, and our 
inability to live in sustainable balance, not just within our bioregion but 
within the earth’s ecosystems, is whether primal cultures are more 
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relevant guides to the future than the ideas of a philosopher who is 
totally unaware that the fate of humans is dependent upon the fate of 
other forms of life that make up the biotic community. The forms of 
knowledge recognized by primal cultures are very close to what 
Bateson is getting at when he says the mental characteristics are 
immanent in the system as a whole, and to what Dogen, the Zen master, 
meant when he answered his own question, “Whoever told people that 
‘Mind’ means thoughts, opinions, ideas, and concepts?” by saying 
“Mind means trees, fence posts, tiles, and grasses.”30 This view of 
knowledge does not lead to final vocabularies in Rorty’s use of the 
phrase, but it does put in focus what should be understood as the 
principal relationships.  
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